I'm continually baffled by the public's distrust of voting machines. You always hear the sensational stories of some hacker breaking in and planting a virus that distorts the vote. The problem isn't the hacker, but the machine makers and frankly the state voting laws which don't seem to have any conception of auditing.
Schneier repeatedly has discussed voting machine issues. Most of them are very good points. The result of all this analysis should be capable of moving the use of voting machines forward.
First, the software/hardware used on the machines should be opened to review. There should be no issue with this even if it requires legislation to protect the intellectual properties. Once the software/hardware is openly shredded by the security community the company should be capable of altering their machines and selling/leasing them for a profit. The government could pay them for the development and then own the intellectual property, but I doubt that wouldn't end up with the $500 hammer.
All machines MUST have a paper trail. The machines will hand a paper copy to the user who verifies the vote and then hands the ballot into the ballot box. Early uses of the machines will then go through a 100% hand count of the ballots and the variations analyzed. The parameters for variance between the machine count and hand count will need to be decided before hand, since human counts of ballots have error rates generally in excess of those by a machine.
Once the machines are initiated for use, they are off limits to any modification, except to disable systems that are clearly malfunctioning. If a system malfunctions, its counts are discarded and the paper ballots will be used. Violations of this precept need to enforced by criminal law. Machines may only be altered once the balloting is completed and accepted.
From then on, machine balloting will undergo a random audit after the closing of the polls. A certain percentage of machines will be chosen randomly from random voting districts. The random selections will occur only after voting is complete. Any variance from the accepted error rates will require all paper ballots to be counted and the machine counts discounted. The machines in such suspect areas will require criminal investigations. Discounted machines will then require a reaction audit to expand hand counts in related voting districts to ensure that any relationships to the flawed or tampered machines is not systemic to a identifiable cause.
There are other methods that can be additionally applied, such as integrity checking of system drives to ensure that the drives content doesn't vary over the usage. There are likely many other safeguards that could be put in place.
Yes, it will take time and money to do all this. The end result will be a voting machine system that is effective and has only minimal risks associated with tampering.
Schneier repeatedly has discussed voting machine issues. Most of them are very good points. The result of all this analysis should be capable of moving the use of voting machines forward.
First, the software/hardware used on the machines should be opened to review. There should be no issue with this even if it requires legislation to protect the intellectual properties. Once the software/hardware is openly shredded by the security community the company should be capable of altering their machines and selling/leasing them for a profit. The government could pay them for the development and then own the intellectual property, but I doubt that wouldn't end up with the $500 hammer.
All machines MUST have a paper trail. The machines will hand a paper copy to the user who verifies the vote and then hands the ballot into the ballot box. Early uses of the machines will then go through a 100% hand count of the ballots and the variations analyzed. The parameters for variance between the machine count and hand count will need to be decided before hand, since human counts of ballots have error rates generally in excess of those by a machine.
Once the machines are initiated for use, they are off limits to any modification, except to disable systems that are clearly malfunctioning. If a system malfunctions, its counts are discarded and the paper ballots will be used. Violations of this precept need to enforced by criminal law. Machines may only be altered once the balloting is completed and accepted.
From then on, machine balloting will undergo a random audit after the closing of the polls. A certain percentage of machines will be chosen randomly from random voting districts. The random selections will occur only after voting is complete. Any variance from the accepted error rates will require all paper ballots to be counted and the machine counts discounted. The machines in such suspect areas will require criminal investigations. Discounted machines will then require a reaction audit to expand hand counts in related voting districts to ensure that any relationships to the flawed or tampered machines is not systemic to a identifiable cause.
There are other methods that can be additionally applied, such as integrity checking of system drives to ensure that the drives content doesn't vary over the usage. There are likely many other safeguards that could be put in place.
Yes, it will take time and money to do all this. The end result will be a voting machine system that is effective and has only minimal risks associated with tampering.
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