Body Armor Controversy

Here it comes again. The Editorials on this topic are just sad. The Boston Globe is just flopping and twitching over this.

EVER SINCE mid-2003, when the US military's smooth overthrow of Saddam Hussein turned into a grinding insurgency, the Department of Defense has stumbled in adjusting to the new conditions. The latest example is body armor. Not until June of 2005, two years into the insurgency, did the military complete a thorough study of lethal wounds that determined many lives could have been saved with more extensive body armor.

That's right. They couldn't finish their study before any data and time had passed to gain that data. Shame on them. And then, they couldn't miraculously and instantaneously design manufacture and implement the new armor in the field. Someone must really have a difficulty with reality. New product development doesn't happen in a week. Design, testing and implementation do actually take some time. Not to mention, there appears to be an expectation that the military planners could use their clairvoyance to discover what the major threats would be and convince the politicos to fund the necessary countermeasures.

Equipping troops with body armor always involves balancing protection with mobility and the risk of heat exhaustion, no small factor in Iraq's high temperatures. But a Pentagon that prides itself on its agility should have recognized sooner that small arms fire and the improvised explosive devices used by the insurgents were causing grievous wounds just outside the areas protected by the standard armor.

Sooner? Yes, that's that rare decision on the part of Boston Globe editors on what is an appropriate amount of time to make decisions. Not having any experience in war or the supply chain associated, I'm sure this editor could do so much a better job. But that makes you wonder why they include IED in the threats. Seeing that personal body armor doesn't protect from the major effect of IED's. You know, that thing called blunt trauma.

Now imagine what they'd be saying if the military went off and sole sourced the armor, in order to get it as quickly as possible, and didn't bother to get the lowest price. Then they'd be wasting taxpayer money.

But that's pretty much the whining happening with the Cougar.

Even more serious problems plague production of a new, heavily-armored truck, the Cougar, which is being built by a small company in South Carolina. The firm, Force Protection, got the contract despite having no experience in mass-producing vehicles.

In a response to the Times article, the Marine Corps Systems Command says it called for a ''full and open . . . competition" for the Cougar, which has withstood every enemy attack in Iraq, but ''that advice was ignored" and a sole source contract went to Force Protection, which has been slow to deliver the trucks.

Just have to ask, does this writer think that the developer of the vehicle would be slower in providing usable units quickly, or should they have waited for the bidding to complete, then wait for the tooling to make the vehicles to be made, and the production line to be made, and the testing and quality assurance to be complete? You think Force Protection is slow, you'd probably have no Cougars at all if you went to open bidding. But let's not bother sticking with any sense of reality here.

Could the supply systems been faster? Probably, but when you're trying to provide fiscal responsibility and fast supply of equipment, you don't tend to get both. And since the politicos and brave editorialists seem to think that body armor grows on trees, maybe I could suggest they get in touch with reality.

I've saved the best quote for last.

The revelations about the military's slow analysis and response to body armor deficiencies are the latest chapter in a long history of the Pentagon's inexcusable lack of preparation for the war it is waging in Iraq. There are still backlogs in the re-armoring of the military's Humvee vehicles.

Nice grip on reality shown there. Or has someone missed that vehicle, and all supplies for that matter are made for general warfare. Design and procurement of equipment solely for fighting in Iraq would mean that equipment for fighting in other venues, such as urban or jungle fighting would not exist. Designs must meet the most protection and functionality for the most variations in a theater of war. I'm certain that the editor has thought about how effective an up armored Humvee will work in a jungle climate. But I'm sure they'll expect the alterations to the Humvee will only take a day or two when needed.

Bloody idiots.