New Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Saw this posted at Global Guerrillas blog. The do comment of the lack of any discussion on the topic of Fourth Generation Warfare. I think his own link to the 4GW may be insightful on this point, since the Field Manual is strongly for the people on the front more than the officers in the rear. (Though I could very well be mistaken in this, I think overall strategy at the front is much different than the complete war plan.)

The tactical and strategic levels will blend as the opponent's political infrastructure and civilian society become battlefield targets. It will be critically important to isolate the enemy from one's own homeland because a small number of people will be able to render great damage in a very short time.

Leaders will have to be masters of both the art of war and technology, a difficult combination as two different mindsets are involved. Primary challenges facing commanders at all levels will include target selection (which will be a political and cultural, not just a military, decision), the ability to concentrate suddenly from very wide dispersion, and selection of subordinates who can manage the challenge of minimal or no supervision in a rapidly changing environment. A major challenge will be handling the tremendous potential information overload without losing sight of the operational and strategic objectives.

Psychological operations may become the dominant operational and strategic weapon in the form of media/information intervention. Logic bombs and computer viruses, including latent viruses, may be used to disrupt civilian as well as military operations. Fourth generation adversaries will be adept at manipulating the media to alter domestic and world opinion to the point where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude the commitment of combat forces. A major target will be the enemy population's support of its government and the war. Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions.

It seems to me that even fourth generation warfare leaves most of the soldiers daily activities much the same, but requires new forces to fight certain new fronts and it also requires that the leadership be able to understand the blending and resonance of the different parts in the overall strategy.

That said, I would think it would be something that all soldiers and marines understand to a certain level, but may not be required to the depth that more specialized forces will need to have.