Rumsfeld Critics Analyzed

Big Lizards has an informative piece looking at the general's and some of the complaints against Rumsfeld. It's not the most precise of blogs, but it is a good starting point to consider the factors of who is complaining and possible motives.

I noticed several things right off:

1. These generals appear to be mostly from the Clinton era. Why is that important? Because, while progression through the rank of Colonel is more or less based upon military performance, elevation to flag rank is by direct presidential appointment. They are, in a sense, Clinton appointees.

Typically, presidents don't hand out stars to people who object to their philosophies; think of LBJ and Gen. William Westmoreland. So the first assumption is that if President Bill Clinton elevated an Army colonel to a Brigadier General -- or made him Commander in Chief of CentCom (paging Anthony Zinni) -- that general is probably a Clintonista.

2. All generals have been in the service for decades. For decades, we have refought World War II -- in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo... by which I mean using more or less the same tactics (mass bombings, invasion by massive, centrally commanded divisions, and so forth). Those at the warfare styles to which these generals were long accustomed.

Even before the Iraq War, Secretary Rumsfeld embarked upon a revolutionary reformation, not only of how we fight wars but also the entire organization of our military forces. He is pushing towards smaller units, more unit independence (moving command decisions down the ranks), much greater reliance on Special Forces, and a reorganization of units to be self-sufficient rather than specialized.

It's hardly surprising that some men who have invested so much of their lives in one particular way of running a war would be angry, rebellious, and confused by a completely different way of running a war... or that some of them would lash out at the symbol of that change. They are no different from vice presidents at General Motors or IBM who furiously denounce splitting those companies into self-reliant business units instead of the normal corporate divisions they've had for twenty years.

Go and read the rest.

The Belgravia Dispatch has an entry on why the generals should be listened too.

Overall, I'm still not convinced that Rumsfeld should be removed. The generals yelping should have some consideration, but the motivations of those yelping must also be understood. Politics rearing it's ugly head again doesn't aid their cause. The Secratary of Defense is a political position no doubt. He's the one that has to decide what political games get moved down to the professional levels. Generals are also, unfortunately, political creatures. The public far too often just gives them the nod as assuming they are the "professionals" when in fact they are playing politics at the same time.

COUNTERCOLUMN has a rather extensive piece on the Generals as well.

UPDATE:
Wretchard also has a decent piece on topic.

The Gateway Pundit gathered a history of the fire-Rumsfeld movement going back to 2003 which shows that while he has for long been the "near enemy" it was always the "far enemy" -- and his policies -- that ultimately mattered. Those policies framed strategy far beyond Iraq. Among the questions for which there is still no bipartisan consensus is how big should the Ground Forces be? On this fundamental point both the President and Congress must bear a fundamental responsibility on which depends the viability of "more boots on the ground". What should the strategy against terrorism be? The Real Security plan advocates a police approach aimed at pursuing a specific group called the Al Qaeda. Is this a correct appraisal of Al Qaeda's importance in the overall strategic landscape? Others have suggested a greater use of "soft power", including diplomacy, in place of utilizing the Armed Forces. Even within the bill of indictments against Rumsfeld there there is still debate over whether the de-Baathization of Iraq, which resulted in the dismantling of Saddam's Army was a mistake. There are many other unresolved questions; and that they have remained so 5 years into the War is an interesting commentary not only on the Bush administration but on American politics in general.