Former General on Iraq

Lt. General Newbold on why Iraq was such a major mistake. Once you cut through his self-justifications and flag waving you get down to his point.

What we are living with now is the consequences of successive policy failures. Some of the missteps include: the distortion of intelligence in the buildup to the war, McNamara-like micromanagement that kept our forces from having enough resources to do the job, the failure to retain and reconstitute the Iraqi military in time to help quell civil disorder, the initial denial that an insurgency was the heart of the opposition to occupation, alienation of allies who could have helped in a more robust way to rebuild Iraq, and the continuing failure of the other agencies of our government to commit assets to the same degree as the Defense Department. My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions--or bury the results.

Another voice to the view that only a military man can justifiably choose what wars to fight. I don't buy it for a second. The "casual & swagger" argument is opinion that clearly has been used by any voice against the war. They never provide justification of that statement either.

His other points ring true, though wars commonly have similar issues, it is still 20/20 hindsight. It would be more convincing an argument if he had remained a general.

Flaws in our civilians are one thing; the failure of the Pentagon's military leaders is quite another. Those are men who know the hard consequences of war but, with few exceptions, acted timidly when their voices urgently needed to be heard. When they knew the plan was flawed, saw intelligence distorted to justify a rationale for war, or witnessed arrogant micromanagement that at times crippled the military's effectiveness, many leaders who wore the uniform chose inaction. A few of the most senior officers actually supported the logic for war. Others were simply intimidated, while still others must have believed that the principle of obedience does not allow for respectful dissent. The consequence of the military's quiescence was that a fundamentally flawed plan was executed for an invented war, while pursuing the real enemy, al-Qaeda, became a secondary effort.

This statement is pretty hard to stomach from someone who "retired" prior to action. It's also a well-worn argument that is slowly being eroded by the documentation found in Iraq. Look at this piece at Captain's Quarters. More details are surfacing that Iraq had involvement with terrorism and Al-Qaeda. What would have been the results in the Middle-East had Iraq not been invaded and Saddam's apparent support not removed? The hindsight of what went wrong is necessary, but denying what went right is just as needed.

His solution, remove Rumsfeld.

So what is to be done? We need fresh ideas and fresh faces. That means, as a first step, replacing Rumsfeld and many others unwilling to fundamentally change their approach. The troops in the Middle East have performed their duty. Now we need people in Washington who can construct a unified strategy worthy of them. It is time to send a signal to our nation, our forces and the world that we are uncompromising on our security but are prepared to rethink how we achieve it.

It would be informative to see if prior Secretaries of Defense or Secretaries of War faced similar calls for removal. There is also the thought that the replacement may be more of a problem than the present Secretary.