Been looking at some discussions about the NY City Subways and the new random searches of people using the subways. The reactions to the London bombings strikes me as a waste of time. The link to Schneier pretty much goes along the same thought.
Without using profiling, which I think is ineffective, the searches are likely to be ineffective. The number of subway users in NY is astounding. (I've seen several sites quoting 4.5 Million users a day.) What percentage of riders will actually be searched? I'm betting it will be miniscule. Then there is the "If you don't want to be searched you can just turn around and leave." So a potential bomber just turns around and tries another time or subway.
I'm not certain that the civil liberties arguments are justified. Subway use must have some legal restrictions to start with. Police can stop vehicles for search in NY prior to use of tunnels or other restricted areas. I haven't found anything that would indicate that people are suing to stop those searches.
I also wonder if the complaints aren't more related to inconvenience rather than civil liberties.
There is the profiling complaint also. This is a difficult system to discuss. Stopping Granny to search her purse is a waste of time. Profiles of the known bombers makes the searches more effective. But, searching only Arab/middle eastern looking males will not likely find anything either. The terrorists would know to avoid the obvious link of physical features to acts of violence. There is also the issue of the Arab/middle eastern population in NY. I'm thinking it likely that there are quite a large population, and random searches then become even more ineffective.
The searches are a show piece security measure. Low effectiveness isn't sufficient to negate their use. Unfortunately, the public needs to see and feel that something is being done, even if it is highly unlikely that the something they see will actually help.
Schneier does state where the most effective of money for security would be though.
Without using profiling, which I think is ineffective, the searches are likely to be ineffective. The number of subway users in NY is astounding. (I've seen several sites quoting 4.5 Million users a day.) What percentage of riders will actually be searched? I'm betting it will be miniscule. Then there is the "If you don't want to be searched you can just turn around and leave." So a potential bomber just turns around and tries another time or subway.
I'm not certain that the civil liberties arguments are justified. Subway use must have some legal restrictions to start with. Police can stop vehicles for search in NY prior to use of tunnels or other restricted areas. I haven't found anything that would indicate that people are suing to stop those searches.
I also wonder if the complaints aren't more related to inconvenience rather than civil liberties.
There is the profiling complaint also. This is a difficult system to discuss. Stopping Granny to search her purse is a waste of time. Profiles of the known bombers makes the searches more effective. But, searching only Arab/middle eastern looking males will not likely find anything either. The terrorists would know to avoid the obvious link of physical features to acts of violence. There is also the issue of the Arab/middle eastern population in NY. I'm thinking it likely that there are quite a large population, and random searches then become even more ineffective.
The searches are a show piece security measure. Low effectiveness isn't sufficient to negate their use. Unfortunately, the public needs to see and feel that something is being done, even if it is highly unlikely that the something they see will actually help.
Schneier does state where the most effective of money for security would be though.
Stop searching bags on the subways, and spend the money on 1) intelligence and investigation -- stopping the terrorists regardless of what their plans are, and 2) emergency response -- lessening the impact of a terrorist attack, regardless of what the plans are. Countermeasures that defend against particular targets, or assume particular tactics, or cause the terrorists to make insignificant modifications in their plans, or that surveil the entire population looking for the few terrorists, are largely not worth it.Hopefully, there is money already there for those plans.
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