UK Plane Plots and the War on Terror

Gotta love Ted-the-Hut's pontifications on the war on terror.

"Five years after 9-11, it is clear that our misguided policies are making America more hated in the world and making the war on terrorism harder to win," Sen. Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts said.

Sure Ted, we should just have given them a big hug and a lot of money and they would have stopped killing us. I would love to know what either of his brothers would have done, or even what he thinks either of his brothers would have done. I'm betting he'd think the bay-of-pigs, though I'm betting they would have been closer to Vietnam.

Then there are the Iraq war postures:

Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid of Nevada said Bush and Congress needed to change course in Iraq and ensure Americans are protected around the world.

"The Iraq war has diverted our focus and more than $300 billion in resources from the war on terrorism and has created a rallying cry for international terrorists," Reid said.

Of course, I don't agree. Iraq has been an excellent fly-paper to concentrate and destroy the Jihadi. I'd even say that the contention that $300 billion was diverted is just stupid. Reid wants you to believe that this money was in some way earmarked for national security. Does anyone have any doubts that this money, for the most part would have been in some pork project rather than put into national security. What would the country have done with $300 billion more dollars in the hands of the Dept. of Homeland security? Gold plated radios? Big comfy chairs for every fat-ass politician? If you take Reid's assumptions without questioning the reality of fund allocations in the government, you have a serious issue with mental disability.

Reid's contention also should get you to ponder what would Iraq have turned into if the US hadn't finally finished the original war. Think Saddam still in power. Think al Qaeda and their previous associations with Saddam's regime. Use your imagination.

The end result of this plot is not surprising. The TSA is getting a huge amount of flak, some of it actually deserved in my opinion.

The Transportation Security Administration, which has overseen aviation security since the September 11 2001 attacks, remains under fire for delays and cost over-runs in new programmes to screen baggage. Airlines have also resisted being charged for additional measures, arguing that federal funds should be increased to enhance security.

"What happened can have an enormous impact on the mission of aviation security around the world," said Kevin Mitchell, chairman of the Business Travel Coalition, which represents corporate travel buyers. "If '[terrorists had succeeded] it would have been 'Lights out! Game over!'" for carriers such as Delta and Northwest which are restructuring to emerge from bankruptcy protection, he said.

The TSA still hasn't figured out profiling. I haven't seen much effort placed in moving forward with frequent flyer vetting and the use of smart-card technology to relieve that portion of the stress on the system. Here's an article from the Heritage Foundation on topic:

An improved risk-based approach to identifying dangerous people would entail separating passengers within the terminal checkpoints into at least three defined groups, based on the quantity and quality of information known about each:

1. Low-risk passengers, about whom a great deal is known;
2. "Ordinary" passengers (mostly infrequent flyers and leisure travelers); and
3. High-risk passengers, about whom nothing is known or there is specific negative information.

Different measures for passenger and bag screening should be applied to each group so as not to waste system resources and passenger time on procedures that contribute little to airport security.

Low-risk passengers are defined as those who have a current federal security clearance or who have been issued a biometric identity card after passing a background check for a registered traveler (RT) program. Passengers in this group would go through express lanes at checkpoints with something akin to pre-9/11 protocols (no removal of clothing or electronics). Their checked bags would not have to be EDS-screened. As a safeguard against the small probability that a dangerous person might slip into this category, a certain percentage of these people and bags would be randomly selected for ordinary passenger screening.

Ordinary travelers might go through something like todays level of passenger screening but with a much-reduced list of banned objects, such as lighters, nail files, and razors. A fraction of this group would be randomly selected for secondary screening (which involves being taken aside for a more thorough inspection of their persons and carry-on bags), as described above.

High-risk passengers include those with no paper trail, about whom so little is known that the safest thing to do is to assume the worst and thoroughly screen both their persons and their checked and carry-on bags. Everyone in this group would receive a more rigorous version of todays secondary screening, including screening of bodies and carry-ons for explosives as well as see-through scanning or a thorough pat-down to detect non-metallic objects. The same protocol would apply to those whose names appear on government-maintained watch lists, although individuals on the no-fly list would simply be detained rather than screened in most cases.

Is any of this happening. The registered traveler program is in a pilot program at a limited number of air ports and hasn't moved any further than that. The rest of the screening techniques are either not done, or are used in a very watered down version. Google it yourself. This pretty much means that security isn't improving, and the ease of use of airports is going to further decrease. Especially when there is some threat somewhere in the world that triggers the TSA to over react.

Personally, I don't want to fly anymore. I'd think that shipping your luggage and needed equipment ahead to your hotel and just carrying a book onto the plane would be easier, except that having no luggage puts you into the category of High-Risk passenger.

The liquid explosive that was proposed for use in the present plot has also set off the knee-jerkers in the press.

Liquid explosives also attack airline security's weakest point - the Transportation Security Administration screeners. They are the burger-flippers of the entire security system, and the chances of even the best of them visually identifying a liquid explosive in an innocuous bottle are slim - that's why Israel's Ben Gurion airport has a laboratory in the basement to conduct instant tests of liquids found on suspect passengers. If the U.S. system lacks sufficient technology to detect liquid explosives, and if it relies on the TSA screeners to ID possible terrorists, it is, at best, a wire mesh fence.

Slight problem with this. The screeners are already a "wire mesh fence." Or maybe Time has missed that they have a fairly high failure rate at finding things like handguns in luggage. Let's not mention that liquid explosives aren't the only type of explosives that could make it through the screening. Plastic explosives or even mixed solid explosives can bypass screening. It merely takes some imagination.

Should I mention the cargo hold section of airplanes? Screening of packages in the cargo holds is fairly low to non-existent still. But go ahead and keep looking at granny's toothpaste.

Catch the posting on topic at the Belmont Club.