NeoCon Errors on Iraq

Niall Ferguson Op-Ed.

I agree that the neocons got it wrong, but my reasons are different from Fukuyama's, and they do not lead me to conclude that the Left was correct all along. The first big neocon error was their abandonment of realism. In particular, there was a failure to grasp the implications of toppling Saddam for the Middle Eastern balance of power. Kissinger was right when he said of the Iran-Iraq war: "A pity they both can't lose." By getting rid of Saddam, the US unwittingly ensured that Iran belatedly won. Now we confront the possibility that Iraq's political future will be determined in Teheran.

Secondly, there was a woeful lack of historical knowledge. Too many people in Washington bought the idea that the post-war reconstruction of Iraq would be akin to the post-Communist reconstruction of Poland. No one paid any attention to the difficulties the British had experienced in trying to govern Iraq after the First World War.

The third and perhaps worst sin of neocon omission was a lack of self-knowledge. In assuming that the US was in a position to do as it pleased in Iraq, the neocons failed to appreciate three deep-seated American weaknesses. (I argued this in 2004 in my book Colossus, and nothing has happened since its publication to change my view.)

And

There is, however, a fourth deficit that I forgot to mention, and that is the chronic legitimacy deficit it now suffers. The most recent findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey - a compendium of international opinion polls - reveal just how far the standing of the US has fallen in the eyes of foreigners in the past six years. And yet the logical conclusion from all this is not that the United States should pack up and march off home. For what precisely is the alternative to American hegemony, benign or blundering? Fukuyama pins his hopes on a new multilateralism, trying to breathe life into the corpse of the United Nations and other kindred institutions. The French fantasise that the European Union should somehow act as a counterweight to American power.

Yet when people in other countries are asked: "Would the world be safer if another country were as powerful as the United States?", they generally say "No". We and the Turks are evenly split, but a majority of Russians, Germans and even Jordanians, Moroccans and Pakistanis think the world would be less safe with a second superpower.

I agree with most of his points, though I would say that Ferguson assumes that his view of "realism" is more realistic. I guess that is an interesting view, but suffers from relativism. I wonder if his analysis is accurate on the Neocon players in Washington. Couldn't the analysis also be made that they saw the need for the action and weighed the knowledge that they had and decided that action was justified even with the deficits that existed?

What would have been the result of going the way of those in opposition to the war? Leaving Saddam in place would have had Saddam getting out of the UN sanctions in a short period of time. More records are now showing that there was official relations between Osama bin Laden and the Iraq government. The result would likely have given security and resources to Al Quaeda once the US was out of Iraq.

No doubt some assumptions of the aftermath of the removal of Saddam were unrealistic. But does the logic really carry that leaving him in place would be a reasonable alternative? Interestingly, Ferguson doesn't go there.

With the glacial reactions of the EU for most of the conflicts of the world, is it realistic to wait for them to be the primary actor when there is substantial risk to the US security? The situation in Iran is a fairly good indicator that the EU, as most of the other players, just don't wish to take action. Expectations of the UN having any effectiveness is just humorous.