This is a Parameters article discussing the counterinsurgency methods used by the British in Malaya and Kenya and its application to Iraq.
I won't quote, because this is a fairly concise article that should be read entirely.
The primary discussion relates to population control of minority groups who tend to support insurgents. The conclusion is that it probably wouldn't work in Iraq at present. Partly from the point that the present political methods in getting the Sunni tribes to participate seem to be working and the likelihood that the American public would not support such an activity.
None of this, as far as I can find, is discussed in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.
You may also be interested in a previous Parameters article related to couterinsurgency, Why the Strong Lose.
Military Review has a couple of articles on Counterinsurgency as well.
I won't quote, because this is a fairly concise article that should be read entirely.
The primary discussion relates to population control of minority groups who tend to support insurgents. The conclusion is that it probably wouldn't work in Iraq at present. Partly from the point that the present political methods in getting the Sunni tribes to participate seem to be working and the likelihood that the American public would not support such an activity.
None of this, as far as I can find, is discussed in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.
You may also be interested in a previous Parameters article related to couterinsurgency, Why the Strong Lose.
Military Review has a couple of articles on Counterinsurgency as well.
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