Max Boot on Strategy in an Insurgency

A decent article relating the historical military thought on insurgency.

While politicians debate whether more U.S. troops should be sent to Iraq, just as important is how those troops will be utilized. In the Boer War, a “surge” of soldiers helped. In the Vietnam War, it didn’t. The difference is that the British had a sounder strategy.

In formulating the right strategy, there is no better guide than a slim 1964 volume, “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” Its author was a French officer named David Galula, who saw service not only in World War II but in postwar China, Greece, Hong Kong and Algeria. If there is a Clausewitz of counterinsurgency, Galula is it.

Although much has changed in recent decades, most of his admonitions still apply, which is why so many are echoed in the new Army-Marine counterinsurgency field manual. U.S. forces have gotten better at this demanding type of warfare in Iraq, but even now they’re still falling short, often through no fault of their own, in carrying out many of Galula’s key precepts:

I've read the book, and it is interesting, but not completely without faults related to changes in how war is fought. I'll give an example below where I disagree with one of his key precepts. First though here are a couple that Boot discusses:

“Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is most likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population’s stand…. Political, social, economic and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population.”

Too often the U.S. has gotten it backward, building infrastructure, holding elections and carrying out other civil reforms in an insecure environment. Expensive projects, such as electrical and water treatment plants, have been sabotaged. Any goodwill won has been ephemeral.

Our top priority must be to establish a modicum of security. Only then can reconstruction go forward.

This is one that I've been complaining about for a while. This is especially true with regards to the use of militias. You can provide the people with security or you can help them provide their own. Unfortunately, the US has spent too much time trying to get the Iraqi military to stand up and provide security, when in fact there are many cases where they are the imported threat.

“Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from beginning until the end.”

There has never been a single boss in Iraq. On the American side, responsibility has been split between the Defense and State departments, which have not always worked harmoniously together. On the Iraqi side, the split is between the Interior and Defense ministries, between the police and army. The situation is especially muddled in Baghdad because President Bush has promised that Iraqis will “lead” operations there. That makes Gen. David H. Petraeus’ job much harder. One of his first tasks as the top U.S. general in Iraq will simply be figuring out command relationships.

No doubt a single leader is preferred, and hasn't been the case. I view a lot of the issues as being the fault of arguments over whose responsibility it was to win the peace. The military came in and got rid of Saddam, but they were not prepared in any manner to take over civilian reconstruction. The DoD and DoS then waltzed around trying to see who would get stuck with the project. I'm thinking that most of this is due to the government not having any plans on how these things should be done, and that leads to the muddling around every time a war occurs. You'd think that someone would have learned that the players need clear designations of what they are supposed to do and plans on how to perform.

Here's one that I don't agree with:

“Expensive constructions for housing the troops should be prohibited…. If no construction other than what is strictly necessary is allowed, the counterinsurgent forces will be forced to live with the population, in shacks if necessary, and this will help to create common bonds.”

The U.S. has spent countless billions of dollars to build an elaborate network of forward operating bases in Iraq where troops are totally isolated from the population. A key part of the Baghdad security plan must be to get forces into smaller outposts where they can interact with locals, gather intelligence and provide security. This may increase casualties in the short term, but it will save American and Iraqi lives in the long run.

The problem with Galula and Boot's contention is that you are expecting a military force to survive in a large country in an era of highly mobile and effective small artillery. Mortars and rockets are common place in Iraq and they are large enough that they can cause severe damage. Especially when facing an insurgency that can hit and run with such weapons on a regular basis. Most of the advanced fire bases require some amount of hardening just to protect the weapons that the soldiers must use. Recall a recent mortar attack that set fire to an ammo dump in a forward base that essentially destroyed the base. The idea is not to ensure that the military personnel aren't safe, but that they are out among the people. Condemning creation of a safe base is ludicrous in the present environment. The casualties from attacks would be substantially higher and would decrease the troops efficiency to the point where they would be useless.

I don't agree with this one much either, mainly due to the poor understanding demonstrated on the technology.

“Control of the population begins obviously with a thorough census. Every inhabitant must be registered and given a foolproof identity card.”

Amazingly enough, the Iraqi and American governments have not issued biometric ID cards—something like our driver’s licenses, with a fingerprint included—to the populace and have not equipped security forces with portable computer terminals linked to a central database.

The lack of such a setup—employed by pretty much every U.S. police department—makes it difficult to tell whether someone stopped at a checkpoint is a wanted terrorist.

First, a "foolproof identity card" doesn't exist. Never has and never will. Mainly due to the fact that it depends on the fool looking at it to ensure that it is accurate. The contention that every US police department has such a system is astounding. No such system exists. There is a centralized finger print repository maintained by the FBI, but that doesn't mean it is complete by any means, nor is it any part of the ID that most US citizens carry. It also makes an assumption that the insurgency isn't capable of using tactics to know where checkpoints exist and to avoid them. The cell phone is very common in Iraq now, and as has been seen in the US, a little planning would allow the insurgents to use the citizens as their watch, just as drug dealers have organized such things in this country. That is an interesting tactic, but one that is easily avoided by fairly minor precautions.

Interesting thoughts none the less. Hopefully the military is moving to provide more effective security in this next surge.